The unequal treatment of children is not gender neutral from the parent side. Our results show that women try to compensate through debt for the unbalanced situation faced by their daughters compared to their sons. However, the lack of symmetry between mothers' and fathers' financial situations leads to the perpetuation of gender inequality through generations.
Introduction
There is overwhelming evidence that girls are discriminated against boys, especially in Asia. Girls are far less educated than boys (King and Hill, 1993; Lewis and Lockheed, 2008) , receive less nutrition (Barrera, 1990; Chen et al., 1981; Das Gupta, 1987) , and less healthcare (Chen et al., 1981; Basu, 1989; Ganatra and Hirve, 1994) , leading to higher mortality rates (Sen, 1990) . On the other hand, poor household's cash constraints are extremely high and the poor have no other choice than juggle with various nancial instruments (Banerjee and Duo, 2007; Collins et al., 2009 ). In particular, borrowing plays a key role.
Previous studies have also demonstrated that the unequal treatment of children is not gender neutral from the parent side. Improvements in female labor force and/or wage translate into better human capital and survival outcomes for girls (Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1982; Thomas, 1990; Kishor, 1993; Haddad and Hoddinott, 1994; Murthi et al., 1995; Agnihotri et al., 2002; Qian, 2008; Jensen, 2010) . This note takes a rst step in generalizing these ndings to gendered borrowing. Indeed, our results show that the debt of mothers depends on their number of daughters, while the debt of fathers depends on their number of sons.
Data
Our data have been collected from interviews of 170 women belonging to Self Help Groups (SHG) conducted in 2008 in rural Tamil Nadu (SouthIndia) in 2008. SHGs typically gather 12 to 20 women who rstly circulate money among each other, and later become eligible for external loans. As SHG members, our sample population likely exhibits a higher propensity to borrow than the average population. However, SHGs are widespread in southern Indian states 1 so that our sample is representative at the very least of a large share of the Tamil Nadu population.
The women in our survey have on average 1.72 children whom there are 0.83 girls and 0.9 boys. These gures are consistent with the relatively low fertility rate registered in Tamil Nadu.
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Indian rural households hardly control their work intensity (NCEUS, 2009; Srivastava, 2011) , so that that parents cannot adjust their levels of professional activity to the size of their households. This is conrmed in our data: the household's total work income and number of children are not signicantly correlated.
As a consequence, alternative sources of cash, like kinship support and borrowing, are needed for covering expenses, and notably those associated to raising children. We indeed observe a signicant correlation with the number of children for the kinship support (ρ = 0.2402, with p < 1%) and, to a lesser extent, for the household outstanding debt (ρ =0.145, with p < 10%). Interestingly, when accounting for the children's gender, the correlations change dramatically. Indeed, neither the kinship support, nor the household's outstanding debt are correlated to the number of girls, but both are positively correlated to the number of boys (ρ = 0.2264, with p < 1%, andρ =0.1368, with p < 10%, respectively).
Nevertheless, considering each parent's debt separately changes the picture. On the one hand, the mother's debt is positively correlated to her number of daughters (ρ =0.1611, with p < 5%), but is insensitive to her number of sons. On the other hand, the father's debt is positively correlated to his number of sons (ρ =0.1479, with p < 10%), but is insensitive to his number of daughters. The next section examines whether these unconditional correlations resist the inclusion of control variables.
Regression Results
We regress each parent's outstanding debt on their numbers of daughters and sons, and on household's characteristics (income, wife's age, education and caste, and dummies for rural area and nuclear family). Table 1 reports the results.
We account for other sources of cash 5 in a progressive way. Firstly, we exclude earnings and kinship support from the regression (column (1) and (4)). Secondly, we include earnings only (column (2) and (5)). Lastly, we include both earnings and kinship support (column (3) and (6)). The regressions conrm the results brought by the rough correlations. Indeed, the mother's outstanding debt increases with her number of daughters, while the father's outstanding debt increases with his number of sons. Nonetheless, the two parents' debts are not on the same scale. One daughter leads her mother borrow 1,500 INR while one son leads his father borrow 7,000 INR. The father's additional debt for a girl amounts to about 2,000 INR, which is not statistically signicant and will do little to close the gender gap.
The intuition behind these results is that women try to compensate through debt for the unbalanced situation faced by their daughters compared to their sons. Unfortunately, their eorts produce limited eects because the mothers' have only few possibilities of raising funds. On the other hand, boys bring not only superior kinship support, but also higher paternal debt, both largely dominating the meager amounts that mothers can borrow on their own. This interpretation is corroborated by the qualitative information gathered during the data collection. Indeed, during interviews the women explained that they are borrowing money hoping to help their daughters do better than they themselves did.
Concluding remarks
This note shows that the intra-household same-gender solidarity observed in the literature for earnings also applies to borrowing. However, the lack of symmetry between mothers' and fathers' nancial situations leads to the perpetuation of gender inequality through generations. Dierential borrowing capacities within households are just reinforcing this persistent inequality. Our ndings thus conrm that poor households should not be seen as unitary models but as spaces of cooperation and conict where members have not only their own preferences and constraints, but also an unequal control over resources (Alderman et al., 1995; Sen, 1990 ).
